The Argentine project, as presented, incorporates a juvenile penal system with alternative measures and a cap on sentences for serious crimes. At the same time, it sets limits on penalties applicable to minors even when tried as adults: they cannot receive the death penalty for crimes committed before the age of 18, and extremely harsh mandatory sentences are restricted because U.S. law recognizes that age reduces culpability and increases the possibility of reintegration. There was room—and need—to design a more operational, tested, and internationally recognized scheme, such as the one governing the United States under the concept of 'selective get-tough': 'adult crime, adult time.' Local discussion often gets bogged down in a false dichotomy: either the age is lowered or it isn't. In the United States, there is no single federal rule, but almost all states operate with 'transfer' systems allowing, for certain crimes and ages, a minor to be tried in adult criminal court. In a country where crime recruits minors to steal, kill, or traffic, knowing that the criminal cost is lower, what is truly dissuasive is not just to prosecute, but to create a system capable of escalating the case to an adult response when the facts demand it, with clear rules, speedy hearings, evaluated evidence, and a proportional sentence. But an operational model—like the one developed by the United States—is a tool. That leap can be decided by a judge (judicial transfer), enabled directly by law (statutory exclusion), or, in some states, by the prosecutor's direct filing in adult court. Something still missing in Argentina: a rapid and functional instrument to remove from the juvenile orbit those who commit crimes with such brutality and danger comparable to adult criminality. The key is that this model is not a 'free pass' for punishment. By Daniel Romero. Buenos Aires - February 12, 2026 - Total News Agency - TNA. The preliminary approval that lowered the age of criminal responsibility to 14, passed by the Chamber of Deputies with 149 votes in favor and 100 against, marks a significant political turn in the debate on security and juvenile criminal responsibility. It is correct but not the total solution, as adult criminals will use children under 13 and continue to do so. It also has constitutional limits that make it more serious than a caricature. In reality, what distinguishes working systems is not just the threshold of culpability, but the legal architecture to separate the minor from the monstrous, the occasional from the systematic, the immature from the instrumental. That is: firmness, yes; arbitrariness, no. That combination—selective severity with a robust procedure—is precisely what was missing in the Argentine debate. But if the real goal is to protect victims, dismantle the use of minors by organized crime, and close 'gray zones' that today guarantee impunity for violent acts, Congress should have gone one step further: it is not enough to move the age line. The preliminary approval lowers the age to 14, but the public discussion was absorbed by the number. If Congress wants to avoid 'punitive marketing,' it must shield the system from two risks: impunity for serious crimes and indiscriminate incarceration for lesser offenses. That is why the Senate has an opportunity: to improve the project by incorporating an explicit transfer scheme for heinous crimes and organized crime, with evidentiary standards and judicial oversight, and with a realistic implementation network. However, the norm is exposed if it does not define with surgical precision a 'bridge' mechanism for extreme cases: homicides, kidnappings, rapes, armed attacks, acts of organized crime, or participation in gangs that use minors as expendable. That is where the American approach offers a practical lesson. Lowering the age can be a message. And in security, messages are not enough: what changes the street is the working tool. Sources consulted: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention of the U.S. Department of Justice (OJJDP); U.S. Supreme Court (rulings Kent v. United States, Miller v. Alabama). That is valuable as a framework. What does it achieve? The U.S. Supreme Court required due process guarantees for transfer: it cannot be an automatic procedure without grounds or a real defense.
